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Using Ex Post Data to Estimate the Hurdle Rate of Abatement
Investments - An Application to the Swedish Pulp and Paper Industry
and Energy Sector
Abstract: We propose a method for estimating hurdle rates for firms’ investments in pollution
abatement technology, using ex post data. The method is based on a structural option value
model where the future price of polluting fuel is the major source of uncertainty facing the
firm. The econometric procedure is illustrated using a panel of firms from the Swedish pulp
and paper industry, and the energy and heating sector from 2000 to 2003. The results indicate
a hurdle rate of investment of almost 3 in the pulp and paper industry and almost 4 in the
energy and heating sector.
JEL codes: C33, D81, O33, Q48, Q53
Keywords: option value, fuel price uncertainty, investment decision, pollution abatement,
panel data, pulp and paper industry, energy and heating sector.
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1 Introduction
A polluting firm usually faces a choice between diﬀerent abatement possibilities ranging
from simple end-of-pipe technologies, that reduce emissions at the end of the production line,
to highly complex clean technology systems that necessitate production process changes.
Engineering studies normally show a range of feasible investment opportunities (with positive
net present values), nevertheless, firms do not invest at the predicted level. Several
explanations have been advanced to explain this apparent puzzle, including errors in the
measurement of costs, heterogeneity in discount rates or, still, market failures (see for example
Hausman, 1979; Sutherland, 1991; Jaﬀe and Stavins, 1994).
Here, we develop a structural approach to measure the impact of uncertainty in the future
price of polluting fuel on a plant’s decision to invest in abatement technology. The proposed
model will assume that the abatement investment is irreversible, since the equipment normally
is firm-specific and has little re-sale value. Fuel use is a major source of air pollution and a
rational firm would normally consider both the pollution impact and any impact on the energy
bill in deciding whether to undertake an abatement investment. Previous research on the U.S.
steel industry, for example, showed that higher fuel prices had a significant positive impact on
the decision to adopt fuel-saving technologies with a potential to reduce pollution (Boyd and
Karlson, 1993).
Choice of irreversible investment under uncertainty relates directly to the option value
theory (McDonald and Siegel, 1986; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994), which predicts that firms may
delay investment because the value of waiting to resolve uncertainty exceeds the value of
owning the asset during the waiting period. Several empirical applications of the option value
theory of investment have been developed in order to explain the slow adoption of technologies
that reduce emissions and the environmental impact of production.1 Most of these use
simulation techniques, though, and there are few ex post studies on investment data. The
main contribution of this paper is to propose a method to estimate hurdle rates for abatement
1We only consider sunk costs of investment and economic uncertainty. Kolstad (1996) and Pindyck (2000,
2002) analyse the more general social trade-oﬀ between sunk costs and foregone benefits as well as economic
versus ecological uncertainty.
2
investments from a structural option value model, using ex post data.
Following Dixit and Pindyck (1994) we derive the threshold condition on the price of the
polluting fuel for which a firm facing uncertainty will decide to invest in a new abatement
technology. The proposed two-step estimation procedure is based on the fact that this
threshold condition holds at the time of the investment. Necessary data are firm characteristic
data (such as fuel consumption, input prices, and output) before and after the investment took
place as well as information on the actual capital costs of investment. The model is adapted to
air pollution from fuel use and the econometric procedure is illustrated using a panel of firms
from the Swedish pulp and paper industry, and the energy and heating sector from 2000 to
2003. The Swedish energy and heating sector is the primary fuel-consuming sector in Sweden,
representing over 30% of total fuel consumption in Sweden (in 2003), but also the pulp and
paper industry is a major user of fuels (10% of total fuel consumption in 2003). Fuel costs on
average account for around 20% of the sales value in the energy and heating sector, and 2% for
the pulp and paper industry, so the model’s assumption of the main uncertainty being the one
surrounding the future price of polluting fuel is particularly relevant for the energy and heating
sector, but is still of relevance for the pulp and paper industry as well. Over the period studied
here, the Swedish pulp and paper industry and the energy and heating sector contributed to a
high extent to industrial-source carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, as well as sulfur dioxide
(SO2) emissions and nitrogen oxides (NOx) emissions.2 The results indicate that the presence
of an option value due to uncertainty in the price of polluting fuel multiplies the standard
hurdle rate for investment by 2.8 in the pulp and paper industry, and by 3.9 in the energy and
heating industry. Although other explanations are possible, firms in these two sectors may
thus delay adoption of irreversible abatement technologies because of uncertainty in the price
of polluting fuel. We also find evidence that investment in abatement technologies has not
induced a significant decrease in CO2 emissions in any of the two sectors.
We review the existing literature in Section 2. Section 3 presents the theoretical model.
The data and background are described in Section 4. The econometric specification and the
2The pulp and paper industry and the energy and heating sector together account for around 50% of stationary
CO2 emissions, 40% of stationary SO2 emissions and 35% of stationary NOx emissions in 2003.
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method we propose are described in Section 5. The estimation results are presented in Section
6, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Abatement Investment Choice under Uncertainty
In standard investment theory, under certainty, there is no option value and investment is
made following the simple Net Present Value (NPV) rule: invest when the present discounted
value of the investment equals or exceeds the investment cost. In the option value theory of
investment, the fact that investment is irreversible and undertaken under uncertainty leads the
firm to consider an additional component in its investment choice, namely the value of waiting
to invest. For example, following Dixit and Pindyck (1994), uncertainty on the value of a new
technology can be modeled as a geometric Brownian motion. By definition, a Brownian motion
is a Markov process, which implies that only current information is useful in forecasting the
future path of the process. Hence, this kind of assumption about the form of uncertainty is
well suited to financial assets because of the eﬃcient market paradigm. Uncertainty
surrounding an investment project can be assumed to follow the same process, since its payoﬀ
can be defined as the diﬀerence between the firm’s discounted stream of profits using the new
technology and its discounted stream of profits using the existing technology. Above all,
though, the assumption of a Brownian motion allows for an analytical solution to the problem.
The option value theory of investment has led to a rich literature of empirical applications,
also in environmental policy analysis. In energy policy, Herbelot (1992) used it to study
utilities’ choice of abating SO2 emissions by installing scrubbers, substituting input or buying
tradeable emission permits. Insley (2003) also studied the choice faced by U.S. power plants to
install scrubbers to control sulphur emissions, assuming that SO2 permit prices are stochastic
and explicitly accounting for the long construction process. She estimated the critical price of
tradeable permits that would cause the plant owner to install a scrubber and her results on
firm investment behaviour are supported by data from the U.S. experience with sulphur
emissions trading. Hassett and Metcalf (1993, 1995) analyzed residential energy conservation
investments assuming that energy prices follow a Brownian motion. The resulting hurdle rate
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for energy conservation investment (4.23) is about four times higher than the standard hurdle
rate when there is no uncertainty. In agricultural policy, Purvis et al. (1995) studied the
adoption of free-stall dairy housing with stochastic milk production and feed costs, and found
a hurdle rate around 2. Diederen, van Tongeren and van der Veen (2003) studied the adoption
of energy saving technologies in Dutch greenhouse horticulture with uncertainty in the energy
price and the energy tax and found a hurdle rate of almost twice the rate predicted by net
present value calculations. Khanna, Isik and Winter-Nelson (2000) analyzed the adoption of
site-specific crop management with stochastic output price and expectations of declining fixed
costs of the equipment. When accounting for the option value, it was preferable to delay the
investment for at least three years compared to the net present value rule, for most soil quality
levels. The value of waiting to adopt this technology also increased the subsidy rates required
for immediate adoption. Carey and Zilberman (2002) simulated the adoption of irrigation
technology when water price and supply are stochastic, and derived a hurdle rate equal to 2.33.
The bulk of these applications use simulations to study the consequences of uncertainty on
irreversible investment. Exceptions are Richards (1996), who analyzes hysteresis in dairy
output quota investment and Maynard and Shortle (2001) that study clean technology
adoption in paper and pulp mills. Richards (1996) uses a generalized Leontieﬀ value function
to derive investment demand equations which are estimated on panel data and which confirm
an option value related to investment in dairy quota licences. Maynard and Shortle (2001) use
a double hurdle rate model as in Dong and Saha (1998) which involves estimating two
reduced-form simultaneous equations, one for the expected net present value of the investment,
the other one for the negative value of waiting to learn more before investing in a clean
technology. The majority of the variables used to proxy the firm’s value of waiting with the
investment were found to be significant.
The only real test of the option value theory that we are aware of is Harchaoui and Lasserre
(2001), who use econometric methods to test whether Canadian copper mines’ decisions on
capacity are compatible with the notion of a trigger price. The results indicate that real option
theory does indeed describe well the actual choices made by the firms facing irreversible
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investment choices under uncertainty.
The contribution of this paper is to present a new method that allows the estimation of
sectoral hurdle rates on ex post data. In the application presented here, we present the first
estimates (to our knowledge) of hurdle rates for pollution abatement investments by Swedish
industry.
3 The Theoretical Model
We use a theoretical model based on the assumption that emissions derive from ineﬃcient
use of a polluting input (Khanna and Zilberman, 1997). Consider a plant using a non-polluting
input (e.g. labour or a clean fuel such as biofuel) and a polluting input (such as fossil fuel) in
its production process. To simplify the analysis, assume the plant produces a single output q
using only these two input factors. Production is a standard increasing but concave function of
the non-polluting input l: ∂f∂l > 0,
∂2f
∂l2 < 0. The polluting input suﬀers heat losses, and its
eﬀective use in the production function depends on the eﬃciency of the process. The
production function f can therefore be written as a function of useful input with technology i,
ei: qi = f(li, ei) with decreasing returns in eﬀective input use: ∂f∂e > 0 and
∂2f
∂e2 < 0. The cross
derivative is assumed negative: ∂
2f
∂l∂e < 0, implying that the polluting and the non-polluting
input are substitutes.3 The parameter hi is used to account for eﬃciency in the polluting input
use with technology i, where hi is the ratio of useful input (ei) to applied input (ai):
hi(θ) = eiai . θ captures firms’ heterogeneity (firms are heterogenous in that the input use
eﬃciency depends on management or other firm characteristics). Applied input represents the
amount of polluting input applied in the production process, whereas eﬀective input is the
amount that is eﬀectively used in production, net of heat losses and other ineﬃciencies. The
production function can thus be written qi = f(li, hi(θ)ai). A plant can choose to invest
(i = 1) or not (i = 0) in a new technology that will not reduce input-use eﬃciency:
h1(θ) ≥ h0(θ). It is assumed that pollution is proportional to applied input: the total amount
of emissions z is a constant share γ of the applied input. Equivalently, we have the relationship
3 In the Swedish context it is important to have clean fuel as a substituting input to polluting fuel, since most
firms in the energy and heating sector and the pulp and paper industry face this substitution possibility.
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zi = γiai. All else equal, the adoption of a new abatement technology does not increase the
pollution coeﬃcient and γ1 ≤ γ0. This modeling is well adapted to carbon and sulfur emissions
from energy use, but constitutes only an approximation of the creation of NOx emissions.4
Investing in the new technology implies a fixed cost (I1 = I > 0 and I0 = 0). Plants are
assumed to be price-takers both in the input and output markets. P is the unit output price,
w the price of the non-polluting input, and m the price of the polluting input. We consider a
“general” model which incorporates an emission tax τ that is to be paid for each unit of
emitted pollutant.5 At a given time, the private profit function reads
Πi(li, ai) = Pf(li, hi(θ)ai)−wli −mai − τγiai and the value of the investment, v(m), is
measured by the increase in the profit flow due to the new technology:6
v(m) = P [f(l1, h1(θ)a∗1)− f(l0, h0(θ)a∗0)]− w(l∗1 − l∗0)− [(m+ τγ1)a∗1 − (m+ τγ0)a∗0]
= P4y∗ − w4l∗ −m4a∗ − τ4(γa∗) (1)
where 4y∗ = [f(l1, h1(θ)a∗1)− f(l0, h0(θ)a∗0)], 4l∗ = l∗1 − l∗0, 4a∗ = a∗1 − a∗0, and
4(γa∗) = γ1a∗1 − γ0a∗0.
In order to focus on the uncertainty in the price of polluting fuel, and to keep the model
simple, we assume constant prices for the output and the non-polluting input. We also assume
that there is no uncertainty on polluting emissions tax rates, but depending on data
availability and the specific case studied, this assumption can be relaxed (see the Model
Specification and Estimation Procedure Section below for a further discussion).7 The future
price of polluting fuel is assumed to be represented by a geometric Brownian motion with
4NOx emissions are largely due to the chemical reaction in the combustion chamber between nitrogen and
oxygen from the air. The extent and speed of this reaction is highly nonlinear in temperature and other combustion
parameters.
5Throughout, we consider a unique type of polluting emissions, z. It would be straightforward to extend the
model to a vector of polluting emissions.
6As is standard, an asterisk denotes the optimal value of the variable.
7For models of policy uncertainty, see Larson and Frisvold (1996) for an analysis of tax uncertainty, and Isik
(2004) for an analysis of uncertainty surrounding a cost-share subsidy and its impact on technology adoption.
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positive drift αm and variance rate σm:8
dm = αmmdt+ σmmdzm where dzm = ε
√
dt, ε ∼ N(0, 1). (2)
The expected price of polluting fuel thus grows at a constant rate αm.
We start by describing the investment choice when there is no uncertainty (σm = 0). The
present discounted value (at the time of the investment, T ) of the increase in profit flows over
all future time periods is:
V (m) =
Z ∞
T
£
P4y∗ − w4l∗ −mT eαm(t−T )4a∗ − τ4(γa∗)
¤
e−ρ(t−T )dt,
where ρ is the appropriate discount rate. The present value can be written
V (m) =
P4y∗
ρ
− w4l
∗
ρ
− τ4(γa
∗)
ρ
− mT4a
∗
δ
. (3)
where δ = ρ− αm. The parameter δ is defined as the diﬀerence between the firm’s cost of
capital and the drift rate of the price of polluting fuel. It is necessary to assume that the
discount rate exceeds the drift in the polluting fuel price in order for the option to invest to be
exercised. The data we use confirm this assumption (the drift rate is estimated at 0.0240 and ρ
is around 20%).
The present value of the investment depends on the price of polluting fuel through the term
(mT4a
∗
δ ). Given that δ is positive, V (m) is an increasing [decreasing] function in the polluting
fuel price when polluting fuel input use decreases [increases] following the investment. In the
first case, an increase in the price of polluting fuel leads to an increase in the present value of
investment, whereas in the second case, it is a decrease in the price of polluting fuel that will
increase the present discounted value of the project.
Without any uncertainty, the firm would invest when the expected present discounted value
of the investment exceeds the cost of the investment, here assumed constant, i.e., if V (m) ≥ I
which is equivalent to a trigger price for investment, mT = m¯, equal to
m¯ =
δ
4a∗
³
− I + P4y
∗
ρ
− w4l
∗
ρ
− τ4(γa
∗)
ρ
´
. (4)
8Berck and Roberts (1996) use time-series methods on data from 1946-1991 which tend to indicate that natural
resource prices are random walks. Harchaoui and Lasserre (2001) tested the sensitivity of their results with regard
to the assumption of a Brownian motion by also simulating the trigger price assuming that output price follows
a mean-reverting process. This did not change significantly their results on the option value.
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All else equal, if 4a∗ > 0 (i.e. polluting fuel consumption is higher with the new
technology) then investment will be valuable if the price of polluting fuel is less than or equal
to m¯. If 4a∗ < 0 (i.e. polluting fuel consumption is lower with the new technology) then
investment will be valuable if the price of polluting fuel is greater than or equal to m¯.
Let us now compare the investment decision under the NPV rule with the investment
decision when the uncertainty around the future price of polluting fuel is taken into account.
The new investment threshold can be derived following Dixit and Pindyck (1994). A new
term, called the hurdle rate (here β1/(β1 − 1)), enters the equation. The trigger price for
investment changes to m˜ (derivation in Appendix):
m˜ =
³ β1
β1 − 1
´ δ
4a∗
³
− I + P4y
∗
ρ
− w4l
∗
ρ
− τ4(γa
∗)
ρ
´
, (5)
where β1β1−1 ≥ 1.
If 4a∗ > 0 investment will be valuable if the price of polluting fuel is less than or equal to
the new trigger price m˜, whereas if 4a∗ < 0 (i.e. polluting fuel consumption is lower with the
new technology) then investment will be valuable if the price of polluting fuel exceeds or equals
m˜.
This new trigger value for investment depends on a term based on the discount rate and the
parameters of the stochastic process:
β1 =
1
2
− αm
σ2m
+
shαm
σ2m
− 1
2
i2
+
2ρ
σ2m
> 1. (6)
A comparison of the two trigger prices for investment (Equations 4 and 5) shows that
irreversibility and uncertainty imply that the polluting fuel price has to be multiplied with
β1/(β1 − 1) for investment to take place in the case when the new technology leads to a
reduction in polluting fuel consumption.
4 Background and Data
For the purpose of this paper, we consider firms belonging to the pulp and paper industry and
the energy and heating sector, for which fuels are crucial inputs in the production process. Our
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data set is an unbalanced panel over the 2000-2003 period of 58 firms from the pulp and paper
industry and 15 firms from the energy and heating sector. Data on firms’ investment in air
pollution abatement technology were collected at Statistics Sweden. This agency has
administered the statistics on investment in air pollution abatement since 1981. The quality
and method has changed over time, though, and comparable data is available only from 1999.
The investment in air pollution abatement technology is defined as “. . . the money spent on all
purposeful activities directly aimed at the prevention, reduction and elimination of pollution or
any other degradation of the environment” (Eurostat, 2005). Statistics Sweden’s survey
includes firms in the manufacturing industry and the energy and heating sector with more
than 20 employees. Samples of roughly 1,000 firms are drawn from a population of 4,500 firms,
and firms with more than 250 employees are surveyed each year. The firm ID numbers allow to
match the existing firm-level data with business data, such as turnover, value added, labor,
and data on fuel consumption and fuel prices at the firm-level. More specifically, we have
information on firms’ consumption and purchases of 12 diﬀerent types of fuels (among them
oil, coal, coke, natural gas and diﬀerent types of biofuel) as well as the annual average price of
each fuel. From these data, we compute an annual average weighted price of polluting fuel as
well as an average annual weighted price of clean (bio) fuel for each firm (in EUR per TJ).
The price of fuel includes all relevant taxes, among which the energy tax and the tax on
CO2 emissions are the most important. The energy tax and the CO2 tax are paid based on the
amount of fuel used.9 These taxes are levied on fossil fuels such as oil, coal, coke and natural
gas while biofuels are in general exempt from energy tax.10 The use of prices including taxes
has implications regarding the specification and estimation of the equation of interest (5),
which is discussed further below in the Model Specification and Estimation Procedure Section.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the overall sample. Over the period covered by the
9The CO2 tax varied during 2000-2003. The yearly levels are available from the Swedish Energy Agency for
each polluting fuel. As an example the CO2 tax for oil was: 1,058 SEK/m3 in 2000, 1,527 SEK/m3 in 2001, 1,798
SEK/m3 in 2002, and 2,174 SEK/m3 in 2003.
10Firms pay the sulfur tax in relation to the fuel used and sulfur content and the NOx fee which is refunded
back to firms in relation to production. In 2003 the total CO2 tax payment in the pulp and paper sector was 45
million EUR, which can be compared to the total energy tax of 4.5 million EUR and the total sulfur tax paid by
the sector of 2 million EUR. Corresponding figures for the energy and heating sector are 143 million EUR in total
CO2 tax, 31 million EUR in total energy tax and 14.5 million EUR in total sulphur tax (Statistics Sweden).
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data, there were 84 decisions (68 in the pulp and paper industry and 16 in the energy and
heating sector) by 47 diﬀerent firms (36 firms in the pulp and paper industry and 11 firms in
the energy and heating sector) to invest in abatement technology among the 73 firms.
Investments in our sample either belong to the end-of-pipe category (for example filters,
scrubbers and centrifuges) or to the clean technology category (above all equipment involving
switching to less polluting raw materials and fuels). In the empirical application, the method
will be illustrated on investments in clean technology aﬀecting CO2 emissions, consisting
mainly of diﬀerent types of biomass (fueled) heating plants (to a large extent doing
reconstructions and conversions of furnaces from oil combustion). Table 2 provides the average
characteristics of firms that invested and firms that did not invest in abatement technology. As
expected, the plants that invested run more fuel-intensive production processes, and their
average fuel cost is higher. Those plants also have on average higher CO2 emissions.
5 Model Specification and Estimation Procedure
Under the assumption that the option value model is a correct representation of firms’
choices, Equation (5) specifying the threshold price necessarily holds at the time when the firm
undertakes the investment. Because the price of polluting fuel includes emission taxes in our
data, we need to estimate a simplified version of Equation (5):
m˜ =
³ β1
β1 − 1
´ δ
4a∗
³
− I + P4y
∗
ρ
− w4l
∗
ρ
´
, (7)
where m˜ is the price of polluting fuel including emission taxes.11 This specification remains
valid as long as we assume that there is no change in the emission coeﬃcient, γ (see
Appendix). This assumption holds only for clean technology investments, where emissions
decrease because of increased eﬃciency in input use.12 We propose to estimate Equation (7)
taking the hurdle rate, β1/(β1 − 1), as an unknown parameter to be estimated. This equation
will be estimated on the sub-sample of firms which actually invested in clean technology during
11An artifact from this simplified version, where price of polluting fuel includes emission taxes, is that we have
a combination of price and policy uncertainty. That is, the hurdle rate results from the uncertainty in polluting
fuel price including taxes.
12 In terms of the theoretical model, h1 > h0 and γ1 = γ0 = γ.
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the period covered by the data, using the observed variables in the year the investment took
place. We will then test whether the hurdle rate is equal to or larger than one. The latter case
would imply that there is a positive option value related to the investment.13 The proposed
estimation procedure requires the following set of data:
• m˜, the price of polluting fuel (including taxes) in the year that the firm undertakes the
investment.
• δ = ρ− αm, in our case the diﬀerence between the firm’s cost of capital and the positive
drift rate of the price of polluting fuel. The drift rate of the fuel price can be calculated
by testing for, and then fitting, a Brownian motion to a long time series of fuel price data
(in our case price inlcuding tax).14
• I, the total investment cost.
• 4a∗, i.e. the diﬀerence between polluting fuel use with the new technology compared to
polluting fuel use if the old technology were still in place at the time of investment. We
observe polluting fuel consumption in the year when the new technology was adopted (a∗1),
but do not know what the polluting fuel use would have been if the firm had not invested
in the new technology (a∗0). The latter can be predicted, though, from the data as long
as some firms invested during the period of observation. The impact of the investment
decision on fuel use can be derived from the estimation of a model fitting polluting fuel
use, using the whole sample of firms. The coeﬃcient of the investment decision indicator
in combination with the data from the year when the firm has adopted the new technology
enables us to predict the polluting fuel consumption if the firm had not invested in the
new technology, aˆ∗0.
• Likewise, 4l∗ [resp. 4y∗] represents the diﬀerence between clean fuel use [resp. output
level] with the new technology and with the old technology. We will follow the same
13 In their test of the option value theory of investment, Harchaoui and Lasserre (2001) calculate the hurdle rate
β1/(β1 − 1) using Equation (6) and test whether the coeﬃcient of this term equals one in a log-log specification
under which the uncertain price is regressed on the hurdle rate and all other variables in the theoretical equation
(capacity choice, discount factors, etc.).
14 If historical fuel price data are not available at the firm level, one can use national fuel price data instead.
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procedure as for predicting the diﬀerence in polluting fuel use, using the estimated coeﬃ-
cient of the investment decision indicator in a model fitting clean fuel consumption [resp.
output].15
In this particular case, it is not necessary to estimate the change in polluting emissions after
the investment took place since emission taxes are included in the price of fuel (and hence the
change in emissions does not show in the right-hand-side term of Equation (7)). However, we
propose to consider an equation fitting polluting emissions in order to test for the impact of the
new technology on pollution in the two sectors.
More eﬃcient parameter estimates will be obtained by estimating a system of equations
fitting simultaneously polluting fuel use, clean fuel use, polluting emissions, and output. A
general form of the system is:
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
ait = f1(X 01,it, β1) + ε1,it
lit = f2(X 02,it, β2) + ε2,it
zit = f3(X 03,it, β3) + ε3,it
yit = f4(X 04,it, β4) + ε4,it
(8)
where i and t are respectively the index for firm and year, and f is an unknown function of the
set of explanatory variables (Xk,it, k = 1, . . . , 4) and parameters (βk, k = 1, . . . , 4). The sets of
explanatory factors (Xk,it, k = 1, . . . , 4) should include a variable measuring the total amount
of the investment by firm i in year t. The usual idiosyncratic error term, εk,it, k = 1, . . . , 4,
is assumed of mean 0 and homoscedastic in each equation, but it may be correlated across
equations (i.e. E(εk,itεk0,it) 6= 0 ∀k, k0). A three-stage-least squares (3SLS) estimator is thus
recommended.
The only parameter of interest at this stage is the estimated coeﬃcient of the investment
variable in each equation. This parameter is used to compute the predicted changes in polluting
fuel consumption, d4a∗, clean fuel consumption, d4l∗, and output, d4y∗. To make it clear, let us
15 If the data contain information on turnover (Py∗) only and not on output separately (y∗), then 4(Py∗) can
be estimated in place of P4y∗.
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describe how we compute the predicted diﬀerence in polluting fuel use for firm i that adopted a
new abatement technology. In year t, polluting fuel consumption with the new technology, a∗i1,
is observed. We predict the change in polluting fuel use with and without the new technology,d4a∗i , as follows: d4a∗i = ∂f1(X 01,it, βˆ1)∂Iit Iit.
The same procedure is applied to compute the predicted changes in clean fuel consumption,d4l∗, and output, d4y∗. These predicted changes are used in the second-stage model where the
hurdle rate b (= β1/(β1 − 1)) is the only unknown parameter. By applying Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) on the model:
m˜it = b
δˆd4a∗it
³
− Iit +
dPit4y∗it
ρ
− w
d4l∗it
ρ
´
+ uit, (9)
we get a consistent estimate of b. The error term u is assumed of mean 0 and constant
variance. This model is estimated on the sub-sample of firms i which have invested in clean
technology at time t. If our specification is valid, the estimated hurdle rate, bˆ, should exceed or
equal 1. A simple Fisher-test will be applied to check whether the hurdle rate is significantly
diﬀerent from 1.
6 Estimation Results
6.1 First stage: estimation of the system of simultaneous equations
We retain a three-equation system, fitting polluting fuel consumption, clean fuel consumption,
and CO2 emissions. Several systems (combining diﬀerent equations with diﬀerent functional
forms and sets of explanatory variables) have been estimated and the system presented here
corresponds to the best fit obtained with our data.16 The equation fitting output (we used
turnover since we do not observe output in our data) was removed from the system because of
its low fit. This result may not be surprising, though, since investment in air pollution
abatement represents on average a very small share of firms’ total investments (between 5-10%
of total gross investments in 1999-2002, SCB 2004). The lin-lin functional form was found to
16 In particular, we also tried incorporating equations for other pollutants (SO2 and NOx). Comparison of
models was made based on the R-square of each equation, and significance of the estimated parameters.
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perform the best. We finally retain the following sets of explanatory variables in the model for
polluting fuel consumption, clean fuel consumption, and CO2 emissions in year t, respectively:
X1t = X2t = (price of labour in year t, price of polluting fuel in t, price of clean fuel in t, net
turnover in t, pollution abatement investment in t− 1) and X3t = (polluting fuel consumption
in t, clean fuel consumption in t, number of employees in t, net turnover in t, pollution
abatement investment in t− 1). The investment variable is lagged one year in order to avoid
endogeneity bias. We allow the coeﬃcient of the investment variable to vary between the two
sectors and types of investment (clean technology and end-of-pipe), in each equation of the
system, and we incorporate unobserved firm-specific eﬀects, ηk,i, (k = 1, . . . , 3), that are
assumed to be fixed parameters that enter additively in each equation. To control for any
correlation between the firm-specific unobservable eﬀect, ηk,i, and the explanatory variables,
we estimate the system using three-stage least squares (3SLS) on the equations where the
Within transformation has been applied.17 The Within transformation eliminates the
firm-specific eﬀects ηk,i, (k = 1, . . . , 3), and the resulting 3SLS estimator is thus robust to any
form of correlation between the firm-specific eﬀects and the explanatory variables.
Also, because some firms do not use any clean fuel, we face censoring problems. To estimate
simultaneous equations with censored variables, we use the approach by Shonkwiler and Yen
(1999). The equation describing consumption of clean fuel, after Within transformation, reads:
l¯it = Φ(qitνˆ)f2(X¯ 02,it, β2) + ξφ(qitνˆ) + ε¯2,it,
where l¯it, X¯ 02,it, and ε¯2,it correspond to lit, X
0
2,it, and ε2,it, after the Within transformation has
been applied. qit is the set of explanatory factors for the decision to use clean fuel at time t,
and ν is the corresponding vector of coeﬃcients obtained from estimation of a Probit-type
model by Maximum Likelihood. Φ(qitνˆ) and φ(qitνˆ) are respectively the univariate standard
normal cumulative distribution and probability density functions computed over Probit results.
ξ is an unknown parameter to be estimated. The set of explanatory variables in the
Probit-type model is the following: sectoral dummy variables, net turnover, solidity, and
17The Within operator transforms each variable in deviation from its mean over the period: in place of any
variable xit in the model, we use xit− x¯i where x¯i = 1/Ti
STi
t=1 xit, Ti being the number of years firm i is observed
in the sample.
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productivity.18 We report the 3SLS estimation results of the system in Table 3.
These estimation results confirm some typical ex ante hypotheses on fuel use and
emissions: polluting fuel use is found to decrease (increase) when the price of polluting fuel
(clean fuel) increases, showing that the two types of fuels are substitutes. The sign of the price
of clean fuel in the clean fuel equation is positive which may be surprising at first sight. This
may be explained by the rapid (and maybe unexpected) increase in demand for biofuel over
the period studied (approximately 47%), which most likely aﬀected the price positively. The
insignificance of the price of polluting fuel on clean fuel demand could on the other hand be
explained as follows: if a firm has already invested in a biofuel furnace, then it is unlikely to
switch back to a coal burner if there is some price changes (like cheaper dirty fuel), because the
long term trend is that the relative price of dirty fuel will increase in Sweden (and elsewhere)
because of climate change policies. Our results also confirm that a higher fuel consumption
translates into higher polluting emissions (CO2 emissions here). The coeﬃcients of interest at
this stage are the coeﬃcients of the investment variable, and we separate between investments
made in clean technology and end-of-pipe solutions. We find that investing in clean technology
has significantly decreased the consumption of polluting fuel in the energy and heating sector,
while investments in end-of-pipe solutions have decreased the consumption of polluting fuel in
the pulp and paper sector. Our results also reveal that, in the pulp and paper sector, the
investments in end-of-pipe solutions have induced an increase in the use of clean fuel. We do
not find evidence of such an eﬀect in the energy and heating sector. If we retain the 15 percent
level of significance, we find evidence of a significant eﬀect of the investment in end-of-pipe
solutions in the energy and heating sector on CO2 emissions, but surprisingly the eﬀect is
positive. The aim of this paper, though, is not to analyse the eﬀect of investment in abatement
technologies on CO2 emissions, and we should interpret this result with caution.19
18Estimation results for the Probit model are not shown here but are available from the authors upon request.
19 In our data we do not only have investments aﬀecting CO2 emissions, but also NOx and SO2. These in-
vestments could potentially aﬀect CO2 emissions, and we do not control for that. Another reason could be the
so called rebound eﬀect, i.e., when the relative price of the polluting input decreases its use increases, but this
remains to be studied more in depth.
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6.2 Second stage: estimation of the hurdle rate
The predicted diﬀerences in polluting fuel use, d4a∗, and clean fuel use, d4l∗, are used in the
computation of the right-hand-side term of Equation (7).20 We need also a measure of δ, which
is defined as the diﬀerence between the risk-adjusted rate of return ρ, and αm, the drift in the
price of polluting fuel. Estimates of ρ are computed using sector-specific data on
economic/business indicators (source: Statistics Sweden). Because information on economic
indicators were only available by quartile, we were only able to derive an upper bound of the
rate of return. This upper bound was estimated at 0.237. In what follows we will test the
sensitivity of our results to various levels of the rate of return. αm is estimated using the
method proposed by Slade (1988) (see also Harchaoui and Lasserre, 2001). We use annual data
on oil prices (including taxes) over the 1980-1999 period (source: OECD).21 The geometric
Brownian motion is approximated by
4mt = αmt + νt, t = 1, . . . , T, (10)
where νt = σmtε is heteroscedastic. The null hypothesis of a random walk cannot be rejected
on our data. The estimated α (0.0240) is used as a proxy for αm.
We estimate Equation (9) on the sub-sample of the 61 investment decisions in clean
technology, using observations at the time of investment. We allow for sector-specific hurdle
rates. The overall fit of the model is good since the adjusted R-square is 0.82. The estimated
hurdle rate is found greater than 1 for both sectors, which confirms the validity of our
approach. The hurdle rate is estimated at 2.84 (standard error 0.1880) in the pulp and paper
sector and 3.89 (standard error 0.5072) in the energy and heating sector.22 Fisher-tests
indicate that the two coeﬃcients are significantly greater than 1 (at the 1 percent level). Hence
our results show that firms in the pulp and paper industry and energy and heating sector have
delayed their abatement investment decisions over the 2000-2003 period because of uncertainty
20We consider only the coeﬃcients that are significant at the 15 percent level. More precisely, the change in
clean energy in the energy and heating sector is considered to be 0.
21Historically in Sweden, oil price and natural gas price (oil and gas are the two main fossil fuels) have covaried.
Hence, the oil price seems an appropriate proxy for the price of polluting energy in this country.
22Because this procedure involves two steps, more accurate standard errors could be obtained using bootstrap
techniques.
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on the future price of polluting fuel (including taxes). The estimated hurdle rates are in the
range of what has been found in previous studies (based on simulation methods): 4.23 (Hassett
and Metcalf, 1993), 2.28 (Purvis et al., 1995), and 2.33 (Carey and Zilberman, 2002). These
figures are not fully comparable to ours, though, as they were derived from simulation studies,
and were concerned with diﬀerent countries, sectors, and sources of the main uncertainty
facing the firm.
We now check the sensitivity of the hurdle rate estimates to the cost of capital, ρ. Because
the cost of capital that we used could be considered as an upper bound for the Swedish
industry, we test how hurdle rate estimates would change with lower costs of capital. We
re-estimate the model in two cases: in the first case ρ is assumed lower by 10 percent
(ρ = 0.213), and in the second case ρ is assumed lower by 20 percent (ρ = 0.190). As predicted
by the theoretical model, a decrease in the cost of capital increases the estimated hurdle rates.
When ρ is decreased by 10 percent, the hurdle rate is estimated at 3.19 in the pulp and paper
sector and 4.38 in the energy and heating sector (in both cases significantly diﬀerent from 1).
When ρ is decreased by 20 percent, the hurdle rate is estimated at 3.65 in the pulp and paper
sector and 5.01 in the energy and heating sector.
In our sample, some firms have invested more than once over the period covered by our
data. We test whether the estimated hurdle rates vary, within each sector, for firms that
invested only once and for firms that invested several times. In both sectors, estimation results
show that hurdle rates are lower for firms that have invested more than once (2.48 versus 3.56
in the pulp and paper sector, and 3.75 versus 4.12 in the energy and heating sector). Hurdle
rates for firms that invested once and firms that invested several times are found statistically
diﬀerent in the pulp and paper sector only (the p− value of the Fisher-test is 0.0060).
Finally note that we could have computed the hurdle rate in each sector directly from
Equation (6), using the estimates of the drift and variance rate from the Brownian motion (αˆ
= 0.0240, σˆ = 0.0292) and the cost of capital (ρ = 0.237). On our data, the calculated hurdle
rate is found equal to 1.37, which is lower than what is found using our econometric procedure
(2.84 in the pulp and paper sector and 3.89 in the energy and heating sector). We believe that
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the econometric approach presented here provides a more accurate estimate of the hurdle rates
since it is based on sector-specific observations instead of being computed using national
averages. The econometric approach described in this paper is thus better suited when one
does not have at hand sector-specific measures of capital cost and/or sector-specific estimates
of the drift and variance rate of the Brownian process.
7 Discussion and Conclusions
The lack of hurdle rate estimates for pollution abatement investments together with the
increased availability of data from firms surveyed over several periods of time call for the
development of econometric approaches based on observed data. We propose one such
technique, which is appropriate when one observes data before and after the investment
decision is taken. This method uses ex post abatement investment data to estimate the hurdle
rate of investment linked to an option value from irreversible investment when there is
uncertainty on the future price of polluting fuel. We illustrated the method on a panel of firms
from the Swedish energy and heating and pulp and paper industry, with information before
and after the investment took place. The null hypothesis of firms following a NPV rule is
rejected as we find a hurdle rate of 2.8 for the pulp and paper industry and 3.9 in the energy
and heating industry. Although other explanations are possible, firms in these two
fuel-intensive industries may thus have rational reasons to delay adoption of irreversible
abatement technology because of uncertainty in the price of polluting fuel. The hurdle rate in
the energy and heating industry is significantly higher than that found for the pulp and paper
industry, which may be a reflection of the higher relative part of energy costs over sales value
for that industry. Uncertainty in the energy price would thus matter more for this industry.
Since the substitution between polluting fuel and clean fuel is important in the two sectors,
we estimated the impact of investments on consumption of polluting and clean fuel in an
intermediate stage. End-of-pipe investments increased the use of biofuel and decreased the use
of polluting fuel in the paper and pulp industry. Clean technology investments decreased
polluting fuel use in the energy and heating sector. We could not find any significant reduction
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in CO2 emissions from the abatement investments in our sample, the only significant eﬀect
being a slight increase in CO2 emissions from investments in end-of-pipe abatement in the
energy and heating industry. Gaining a better understanding of abatement decisions within
fuel-intensive sectors like the energy and heating and pulp and paper industry is important,
since these sectors are important sources of CO2 emissions, a greenhouse gas, but also of SO2
and NOx emissions. Since the proposed model is based on uncertainty on the future price of
polluting fuel, it would be suited to apply for further study on investment in air pollution
emission reduction in other sectors as well. The proposed method could hopefully provide
insights into the potential for policy measures to reduce carbon emissions as well as
conventional pollutants.
One limitation of our study was that we could not include variable costs of abatement
investments, nor depreciation costs, in the model since the data were not available. Future
extensions could include additional aspects of uncertainty related to irreversible abatement
investment, in particular the future cost of investment. If pollution-reducing technology
becomes cheaper over time, then an additional explanation for firms delaying investment could
be the expected gain from a fall in the investment cost. Issues related to research and
development of the new technology were also absent from our analysis.23
Our main result that the hurdle rate is significantly greater than one in these two sectors has
some direct implications for environmental policy. First, it confirms that uncertainty on the
future price of polluting energy is one reason why there may be delay in adopting irreversible
less polluting technologies. One obvious conclusion is that the policymaker should try to
minimize the value to wait with adoption for the firm by attempting to reduce the uncertainty
facing the firm through a reduction in price volatility.24 On the other hand, frequent
adjustments of tax rates carry transaction costs. As argued by Dosi and Moretto (1997), the
policymaker has to try to reduce the uncertainty of new technology adoption, and either a
consistent tax policy or announcements of stringent pollution standards might do this. A
23Even if the new technology is valuable, its arrival date could be uncertain. In this case, van Soest and Bulte
(2001) have shown that the option value related to waiting for an even better technology makes the impact on
the adoption lag ambiguous.
24That kind of policy would have distributional consequences, though, that are outside the scope of this paper.
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policy recommendation must be based on each specific case and in our empirical application
the price of polluting energy is subject to a combination of two uncertainties, the uncertainty
in the price excluding policy and the policy uncertainty. Further, we study investment
decisions to reduce CO2 emissions, and for this particular case it might be wise to reduce the
policy uncertainty through a more consistent tax policy with high constant taxes on carbon
emissions, since this would correspond to the seriousness of the problem of climate change, and
hence over time the policy component is likely to become of greater importance than the price
uncertainty itself.
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Tables
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (at the firm level)
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
CO2 emissions (tonne/year) 94 276 0.02 2,066
Total fuel consumption (TJ/year) 1,520.9 2,299.4 0.21 16,723.5
Total clean fuel consumption (TJ/year) 809.8 1,341.1 0 7,373.9
Total polluting fuel consumption (TJ/year) 711 1,302.9 0.21 11,024
Total fuel price (kEUR/TJ) 7.12 3.62 1.52 17.53
Price of clean fuel (kEUR/TJ) 2.11 2.33 0 7.94
Price of polluting fuel (kEUR/TJ) 7.92 3.39 0.95 17.53
Number of workers 577 557 27 3,938
Total wages (kEUR/(worker*year) ) 33.86 4.54 22.03 52.45
Turnover (kEUR/year) 206,726 279,260 5,126 2,420,681
Number of plants 73
Number of observations 166
Note: 1 EUR = 9.04704 SEK, using values from Monday, December 18, 2006.
Table 2: Average characteristics of investors and non-investors
Variable Non-investors Investors
CO2 emissions (tonne) 28 124
Fuel use (TJ/year) 534 1,959
Fuel cost (kEUR/year) 3,826 8,722
Number of workers 324 689
Turnover (kEUR/year) 76,692 264,393
Number of plants 26 47
Note: 1 EUR = 9.04704 SEK, using values from Monday, December 18, 2006.
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Table 3: 3SLS Estimation results - System of simultaneous equations
Coef. Std. Err. P-value
Equation for polluting fuel use (fossil fuel)
Price of labour 1.8129 1.6334 0.267
Price of polluting fuel -5.8920 2.3637 0.013
Price of clean fuel 9.7965 2.7888 0.000
Net turnover 0.0002 0.0001 0.054
Clean technology investment (sector 21) -0.0100 0.0070 0.155
Clean technology investment (sector 40) -0.0140 0.0043 0.001
End of pipe investment (sector 21) -0.0353 0.0184 0.055
End of pipe investment (sector 40) 0.0214 0.0207 0.300
χ2-test (p-value in parenthesis): 37.79 (0.0000)
Equation for clean fuel use (biofuel)
Price of labour -11.3413 3.1712 0.000
Price of polluting fuel -0.9738 4.5503 0.831
Price of clean fuel 8.9421 4.6107 0.052
Net turnover 0.0005 0.0001 0.000
Clean technology investment (sector 21) 0.0131 0.0094 0.163
Clean technology investment (sector 40) 0.0012 0.0060 0.846
End of pipe investment (sector 21) 0.1350 0.0252 0.000
End of pipe investment (sector 40) 0.0016 0.0257 0.949
Additional term 61.0512 79.0347 0.440
χ2-test (p-value in parenthesis): 57.11 (0.0000)
Equation for CO2 emissions
Total polluting fuel use 0.0522 0.0076 0.000
Total clean fuel use -0.0004 0.0076 0.962
Number of employees 0.0056 0.0262 0.832
Net turnover 3.63E-06 5.840E-06 0.534
Clean technology investment (sector 21) -0.0003 0.0004 0.483
Clean technology investment (sector 40) -0.0001 0.0002 0.719
End of pipe investment (sector 21) -0.0007 0.0013 0.553
End of pipe investment (sector 40) 0.0017 0.0011 0.116
χ2-test (p-value in parenthesis): 93.36 (0.0001)
Number of observations: 166.
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Appendix
Derivation of the trigger price for investment under uncertainty (Equation 5 in the
text):
The future price of polluting fuel is represented by a geometric Brownian motion with positive
drift αm and variance rate σm:
dm = αmmdt+ σmmdzm where dzm = ε
√
dt, ε ∼ N(0, 1).
Denote the option value as a function of the fuel price F (m). Let ρ be the firm’s opportunity
cost of capital, assumed exogenous here. The Bellman equation is
ρF (m)dt = E[dF (m)],
which means that, over the interval dt, the rate of return of the option to invest should equal
the expected rate of its capital appreciation. Applying Ito’s Lemma to expand dF (m) gives1
1
2
σ2mm
2F 00(m) + αmmF 0(m)− ρF (m) = 0. (1)
F (m) should satisfy the above diﬀerential equation plus the boundary conditions (2)-(4):
F (0) = 0 (2)
The value of the option is zero when the energy price is zero.
F (m˜) = V (m˜)− I (3)
The value-matching condition: at the trigger price, the value of the option to invest equals
the net value of the investment.
F 0(m˜) = V 0(m˜) (4)
1Partial derivatives denoted by a prime.
The smooth-pasting condition: at the trigger price, the change in the value of the option
should equal the change in the expected present value of the investment.
Given the boundary conditions, the general solution to the problem can be reduced to the
form F (m) = A1mβ1 .
The expected present value of the investment at the trigger price is defined as
V (m˜) =
P4y∗
ρ
− w4l
∗
ρ
− m˜4a
∗
δ
− τ4(γa
∗)
ρ
(5)
where δ = ρ− αm. Equations (2) to (5) then imply that
V (m˜)− I = −4a
∗m˜
δβ1
(6)
where β1 is the positive root of the fundamental quadratic equation
1
2
σ2mβ1(β1 − 1) + αmβ1 − ρ = 0. (7)
Substituting (5) into (6) and rearranging gives the trigger price m˜:
m˜ = (
β1
β1 − 1
)
δ
4a∗ (−I +
P4y∗
ρ
− w4l
∗
ρ
− τ4(γa
∗)
ρ
). (8)
Derivation of Equation 7:
The last term in Equation (1) in the text can be rewritten as follows:
−τ4(γa∗) = −τ [γ1 − γ0]a∗1 − τγ0[a∗1 − a∗0] (9)
We then have that v(m), in the notation from the text, can be written as:
v(m) = P4y∗ − w4l∗ −m4a∗ − τγ04a∗ − τ4γa∗1 (10)
In the case of CO2 emissions, no end-of-pipe abatement technology exists to date,
so we will study clean technology investments, for which h1 > h0 but γ1 = γ0 = γ, that is
abatement investments that increase the eﬃciency with which a polluting input is used, but
does not directly reduce the emission coeﬃcient. Hence, we have 4γ = 0, and
v(m) = P4y∗ − w4l∗ −m4a∗ − τγ4a∗ (11)
The present discounted value (at the time of the investment, T ) of the increase in
profit flows over all future time periods is:
V (m) =
Z ∞
T
£
P4y∗ −w4l∗ − (mT + γτT )eαm(t−T )4a∗)
¤
e−ρ(t−T )dt, (12)
where ρ is the appropriate discount rate. The present value can be written
V (m) =
P4y∗
ρ
− w4l
∗
ρ
− (mT + γτT )4a
∗
δ
. (13)
where δ = ρ− αm.
The new trigger price under uncertainty is
(mT + γτT ) = (
β1
β1 − 1
)
δ
4a∗
³
− I + P4y
∗
ρ
− w4l
∗
ρ
). (14)
